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Abstract
We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms
for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valua-
tions we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for
divisible items. We use this to show that there can also be no randomized mechanism
that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. For single-dimensional val-
uations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties
for indivisible items, but that there is a randomized mechanism that achieves this for
either divisible or indivisible items. The impossibility results hold for public budgets,
while the mechanism allows private budgets, which is in both cases the harder variant
to show. While all positive results are polynomial-time algorithms, all negative results
hold independent of complexity considerations.
1 Introduction
A canonical problem in Mechanism Design is the design of economically efficient auctions
that satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibility. In settings with quasi-linear
utilities these goals are achieved by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. In
many practical situations, including settings in which the agents have budget limits, the
quasi-linear assumption fails to be true and, thus, the VCG mechanism is not applicable.
Ausubel [2] describes an ascending-bid auction for homogeneous items that yields the
same outcome as the sealed-bid Vickrey auction, but offers advantages in terms of sim-
plicity, transparency, and privacy preservation. In his concluding remarks he points out
that “when budgets impair the bidding of true valuations in a sealed-bid Vickrey auction,
a dynamic auction may facilitate the expression of true valuations while staying within
budget limits” (p. 1469).
Dobzinski et al. [7] show that an adaptive version of Ausubel’s “clinching auction” is
indeed the unique mechanism that satisfies individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and
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incentive compatibility in settings with public budgets. They use this fact to show that
there can be no mechanism that achieves those properties for private budgets.
An important restriction of Dobzinski et al.’s impossibility result for private budgets is
that it only applies to deterministic mechanisms. In fact, as Bhattacharya et al. [4] show,
there exists a randomized auction that is individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive
compatible with private budgets.
All these results assume that the items are homogeneous, although as Ausubel [3]
points out, “situations abound in diverse industries in which heterogeneous (but related)
commodities are auctioned” (p. 602). He also describes an ascending-bid auction, the
“crediting and debiting auction”, that takes the place of the “clinching auction” when
items are heterogeneous.
Positive and negative results for deterministic mechanisms and public budgets are given
in [8, 10, 9, 6]. We focus on randomized mechanisms, and prove positive results for private
budgets and negative results for public budgets. We thus explore the power and limitations
of randomization in settings with heterogeneous items and budget limits.
Model. There are n agents and m items. The items are either divisible or indivisible.
Each agent has a valuation for each item and each agent has a budget. Agents can be
assigned more than one item and valuations are additive across items. All valuations are
private. We distinguish between settings in which budgets are public and settings in which
budgets are private. A mechanism is used to compute assignments and payments based on
the reported valuations and the reported budgets. An agent’s utility is defined as valuation
for the assigned items minus the payment if the payment does not exceed the budget and
the utility is minus infinity otherwise. We assume that agents are utility maximizers and
as such need not report their true valuations and true budgets.
Our goal is to design mechanisms with certain desirable properties or to show that
no such mechanism exists. For deterministic mechanisms we require that the respective
properties are always satisfied. For randomized mechanisms we either require that the
properties hold for all outcomes or that they hold in expectation. In the former case they
are satisfied ex post, in the latter they are satisfied ex interim.
We are interested in the following properties:
(a) Individual rationality (IR): A mechanism is IR if all outcomes it produces give non-
negative utility to the agents and the sum of the payments is non-negative. (b) Pareto
optimality (PO): A mechanism is PO if it produces an outcome such that there is no
other outcome in which all agents and the auctioneer are no worse off and at least one of
the agents or the auctioneer is strictly better off. 1 (c) No positive transfers (NPT): A
mechanism satisfies NPT if it produces an outcome in which all payments are non-negative.
1If the outcome for which we want to establish PO is IR, then we only have to consider alternative
outcomes that are IR. In the alternative outcome individual payments may be negative, even if the original
outcome satisfied IR and NPT. See the arXiv version of [8] for a more detailed discussion.
2
(d) Incentive compatibility (IC): A mechanism is IC if each agent maximizes his utility by
reporting his true valuation(s) and true budget no matter what the other agents’ reported
valuations and reported budgets are. If the budget is public then the agents can only report
their true budgets.
Following prior work we focus on IR, PO, NPT, and IC for positive results and on IR,
PO, and IC for negative results. Both the inclusion of NPT for positive results and the
exclusion of NPT for negative results strengthens the respective results.
Results. We analyze two settings with heterogeneous items, one with multi-dimensional
valuations and one with single-dimensional valuations. In the setting with multi-
dimensional valuations, each agent has an arbitrary, non-negative valuation for each of
the items. In the setting with single-dimensional valuations, which is inspired by spon-
sored search auctions, an agent’s valuation for an item is the product of an item-specific
quality and an agent-specific valuation. Our motivation for studying this setting is that an
advertiser might want to show his ad in multiple slots on a search result page.
(a) For multi-dimensional valuations the impossibility result of [8] implies that there
can be no deterministic mechanism for indivisible items that is IR, PO, and IC for public
budgets. We show that there also can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties
for divisible items. We use this to show that for both divisible and indivisible items there
can be no randomized mechanism that is IR ex interim, PO ex interim, and IC ex interim.
This is the first impossibility result for randomized mechanisms for auctions with budget
limits. It establishes an interesting separation between randomized mechanisms for single-
dimensional valuations, where such mechanisms exist (see below), and multi-dimensional
valuations, where no such mechanism exists.
(b) For single-dimensional valuations the impossibility result of [7] implies that there
can be no deterministic mechanism for indivisible items that is IR, PO, and IC for private
budgets. We show that for heterogeneous items there can also be no deterministic mech-
anism for indivisible items that is IR, PO, and IC for public budgets. We thus obtain a
strong separation between deterministic mechanisms, that do not exist for public budgets,
and randomized mechanisms, that exist for private budgets (see below). This separation is
stronger than in the homogeneous items setting, where a deterministic mechanism exists
for public budgets [7]. Additionally, our impossibility result is tight in the sense that if
any of the conditions is relaxed such a mechanism exists: (i) For homogeneous, indivisible
items a deterministic mechanism is given in [7], (ii) we give a deterministic mechanism for
heterogeneous, divisible items, and (iii) we give a randomized mechanism for heterogeneous,
indivisible items.
(c) For single-dimensional valuations we give mechanisms that extend earlier work for
homogeneous items to heterogeneous items. Specifically, we give a randomized mechanism
that satisfies IR ex interim, NPT ex post, PO ex post, and IC ex interim for divisible or
indivisible items and public or private budgets. Additionally, for the case of divisible items
and public budgets we give a deterministic mechanism that is IR, NPT, PO, and IC.
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We summarize our results and the results from related work described next in Table 1
and Table 1 below.
Related Work. The setting in which all items are identical was first studied by [7].
By adapting the “clinching auction” of [2] from settings without budgets to settings with
budgets they obtain deterministic mechanisms that are IR, NPT, PO, and IC with public
budgets for divisible and indivisible items. They also show that these mechanisms are the
only mechanisms that are IR, PO, and IC, and that they are not IC for private budgets,
implying that there can be no deterministic mechanism that is IR, PO, and IC when the
budgets are private. However, [4] showed that there is such a mechanism for private budgets
that is randomized. Note that both, [7] and [4] study only homogeneous items.
Impossibility results for general, non-additive valuations were given in [10, 6, 9]. Com-
bined they show that there can be no deterministic mechanism for indivisible items that
is IR, PO, and IC with public budgets for monotone valuations with decreasing marginals.
These impossibility results do not apply to additive valuations, which is the case that we
study.
Heterogeneous items were first studied in [8]. In their model each agent has the same
valuation for each item in an agent-dependent interest set and zero for all other items.
They give a deterministic mechanism for indivisible items that satisfies IR, NPT, PO, and
IC when both interest sets and budgets are public. They also show that when the interest
sets are private, then there can be no deterministic mechanism that satisfies IR, PO, and
IC. This implies that for indivisible items and public budgets there can be no deterministic
IR, PO, and IC mechanism for unconstrained valuations.
Settings with heterogeneous items were in parallel to this paper studied by [6] and [9].
The former study problems with multiple keywords, each having multiple slots. Agents
have unit demand per keyword. They are either interested in a subset of the keywords
and have identical valuations for the slots or they are interested in all keywords and have
sponsored search like valuations for the slots. The latter study settings in which the agents
have identical valuations and the allocations must satisfy polymatroidal or polyhedral
constraints.
The settings studied in [6, 9] are more general than the single-dimensional valuations
setting studied here. On the one hand this implies that their positive results apply to the
single-dimensional valuations setting studied here, and show that there are deterministic
mechanisms for divisible items and randomized mechanisms for both divisible and indivisi-
ble items that are IC with public budgets. On the other hand this implies that our negative
result for the single-dimensional valuations setting applies to the settings studied in these
papers, and shows that there can be no deterministic mechanisms that are IC with public
budgets for indivisible items. Finally, the impossibility results presented in [6, 9] either
assume that the valuations are non-additive or that the allocations satisfy arbitrary poly-
hedral constraints and have therefore no implications for the multi-dimensional valuations
setting studied here.
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Overview. We summarize the results from related work and this paper for indivisible
items in Table 1 and for divisible items in Table 1. We use a plus (+ or ⊕) to indicate
that there is an IR, PO, NPT, and IC mechanism. We use a minus (− or ⊖) to indicate
that there is no IR, PO, and IC mechanism. We use + and − for results from related work
and ⊕ and ⊖ for results from this paper. A question mark (?) indicates that nothing is
known for this setting. For the model of [8] the table has two entries, one for public and
one for private interest sets. While all positive results from this paper are polynomial-time
algorithms, all negative results hold independent of complexity considerations.
Table 1: Results for Indivisible Items from Related Work and this Paper
homogeneous heterogeneous & additive
add. non-add.
interest set multi-keyword
single-dim. multi-dim.
budgets public/private unit demand
det.
public + [7] −[10, 6] +[8]/−[8] ⊖ ⊖ − [8]
private − [7] − [7] −[7]/−[7] − [7] −[7] − [7]
rand.
public + [7] ? +[8]/? +[6, 9] ⊕ ⊖
private + [4] ? ?/? ? ⊕ ⊖
Table 2: Results for Divisible Items from Related Work and this Paper
homogeneous heterogeneous & additive
add. non-add.
polymatroid multi-keyword
single-dim. multi-dim.
budgets constraints unit demand
det.
public + [7, 4] −[9] +[9] +[6, 9] ⊕ ⊖
private − [7] −[7] − [7] − [7] − [7] − [7]
rand.
public + [7, 4] ? +[9] +[6, 9] ⊕ ⊖
private + [4] ? ? ? ⊕ ⊖
Techniques. Our technical contributions are as follows:
(a) For multi-dimensional valuations we obtain a partial characterization of IC by gen-
eralizing the “weak monotonicity” (WMON) condition of [5] from settings without budgets
to settings with public budgets. We obtain our impossibility result for deterministic mecha-
nisms and divisible items by showing that in certain settings WMON will be violated. For
this we use that multi-dimensional valuations enable the agents to lie in a sophisticated
way: While all previous impossibility proofs in this area used agents that either only over-
state or only understate their valuations, we use an agent that overstates his valuation for
one item and understates his valuation for another.
(b) For single-dimensional valuations and both divisible and indivisible items we char-
acterize PO by a simpler “no trade” (NT) condition. Although this condition is more
complex than similar conditions in [7, 4, 8], we are able to show that an outcome is PO
if and only if it satisfies NT. We also generalize the “classic”characterization results of
IC mechanism of [11, 1] from settings without budgets to settings with public budgets by
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showing that a mechanism is IC with public budgets if and only if it satisfies “value mono-
tonicity” (VM) and “payment identity” (PI). The characterizations of PO and IC with
public budgets play a crucial role in the proof of our impossibility result for indivisible
items, which uses NT and PI to derive lower bounds on the agents’ payments that conflict
with the upper bounds on the payments induced by IR.
(c) We establish the positive results for single-dimensional valuations and both divisible
and indivisible items by giving a new reduction of this case to the case of a single and by
definition homogeneous item. This allows us to apply the techniques that [4] developed
for the single-item setting. This is a general reduction between the heterogeneous items
setting and the homogeneous items setting, which is likely to have further applications.
(d) We give an explicit polynomial-time algorithm for the “adaptive clinching auction”
for divisible items and an arbitrary number of agents. To the best of our knowledge we
are the first ones to actually give a polynomial-time version of this auction for arbitrarily
many agents.
2 Problem Statement
We are given a set N of n agents and a set M of m items. We distinguish between settings
with divisible items and settings with indivisible items. In both settings we use X =∏n
i=1Xi for the allocation space. For divisible items the allocation space is Xi = [0, 1]
m
for all agents i ∈ N and xi,j ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of item j ∈ M that is allocated
to agent i ∈ N . For indivisible items the allocation space is Xi = {0, 1}
m for all agents
i ∈ N and xi,j ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether item j ∈ M is allocated to agent i ∈ N or
not. In both cases we require that
∑n
i=1 xi,j ≤ 1 for all items j ∈ M . We do not require
that
∑m
j=1 xi,j ≤ 1 for all agents i ∈ N , i.e., we do not assume that the agents have unit
demand.
Each agent i has a type θi = (vi, bi) consisting of a valuation function vi : Xi → R≥0
and a budget bi ∈ R≥0. We use Θ =
∏n
i=1Θi for the type space. We consider two settings
with heterogeneous items, one with multi- and one with single-dimensional valuations. In
the first setting, each agent i ∈ N has a valuation vi,j ∈ R≥0 for each item j ∈ M and
agent i’s valuation for allocation xi is vi(xi) =
∑m
j=1 xi,jvi,j. In the second setting, which
is inspired by sponsored search auctions, each agent i ∈ N has a valuation vi ∈ R≥0, each
item j ∈ M has a quality αj ∈ R≥0, and agent i’s valuation for allocation xi ∈ Xi is
vi(xi) =
∑m
j=1 xi,jαjvi. For simplicity we will assume that in this setting α1 > α2 > · · · >
αm and that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn > 0.
A (direct revelation) mechanisms M = (x, p) consisting of an allocation rule x : Θ→ X
and a payment rule p : Θ→ Rn is deployed to compute an outcome (x, p) consisting of an
allocation x ∈ X and payments p ∈ Rn. We say that a mechanism is deterministic if the
computation of (x, p) is deterministic, and it is randomized if the computation of (x, p) is
randomized.
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We assume that the agents are utility maximizers and as such need not report their
types truthfully. We consider settings in which both the valuations and budgets are private
and settings in which only the valuations are private and the budgets are public. When
the valuations resp. budgets are private, then the other agents have no knowledge about
them, not even about their distribution. In the former setting a report by agent i ∈ N
with true type θi = (vi, bi) can be any type θ
′
i = (v
′
i, b
′
i). In the latter setting agent i ∈ N
is restricted to reports of the form θ′i = (v
′
i, bi). In both settings, if mechanism M = (x, p)
is used to compute an outcome for reported types θ′ = (θ′1, . . . , θ
′
n) and the true types are
θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) then the utility of agent i ∈ N is
ui(xi(θ
′), pi(θ
′), θi) =
{
vi(xi(θ
′))− pi(θ
′) if pi(θ
′) ≤ bi, and
−∞ otherwise.
For deterministic mechanisms and their outcomes we are interested in the following
properties:
(a) Individual rationality (IR): A mechanism is IR if it always produces an IR outcome.
An outcome (x, p) for types θ = (v, b) is IR if it is (i) agent rational: ui(xi, pi, θi) ≥ 0 for
all agents i ∈ N and (ii) auctioneer rational:
∑n
i=1 pi ≥ 0. (b) Pareto optimality (PO):
A mechanism is PO if it always produces a PO outcome. An outcome (x, p) for types
θ = (v, b) is PO if there is no other outcome (x′, p′) such that ui(x
′
i, p
′
i, θi) ≥ ui(xi, pi, θi)
for all agents i ∈ N and
∑n
i=1 p
′
i ≥
∑n
i=1 pi, with at least one of the inequalities strict.
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(c) No positive transfers (NPT): A mechanism satisfies NPT if it always produces an NPT
outcome. An outcome (x, p) satisfies NPT if pi ≥ 0 for all agents i ∈ N. (d) Incentive
compatibility (IC): A mechanism satisfies IC if for all agents i ∈ N , all true types θ, and
all reported types θ′ we have ui(xi(θi, θ
′
−i), pi(θi, θ
′
−i), θi) ≥ ui(xi(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), pi(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), θi).
If a randomized mechanism satisfies any of these conditions in expectation, then we say
that the respective property is satisfied ex interim. If it satisfies any of these properties
for all outcomes it produces, then we say that it satisfies the respective property ex post.
3 Multi-Dimensional Valuations
In this section we obtain a partial characterization of mechanisms that are IC with public
budgets by generalizing the “weak monotonicity” condition of [5] from settings without
budgets to settings with budgets. We use this partial characterization together with a
sophisticated way of lying, in which an agent understates his valuation for some item
and overstates his valuation for another item, to prove that there can be no deterministic
mechanism for divisible items that is IR, PO, and IC with public budgets. Afterwards, we
use this result to show that there can be no randomized mechanism for either divisible or
indivisible items that is IR ex interim, PO ex interim, and IC ex interim for public budgets.
2Both IR and PO are defined with respect to the reported types, and are satisfied with respect to the
true types only if the mechanism also satisfies IC.
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Partial Characterization of IC. For settings without budgets every mechanism that is
incentive compatible must satisfy what is known as weak monotonicity (WMON), namely
if x′i and xi are the assignments of agent i for reports v
′
i and vi, then the difference in
the valuations for the two assignments must be at least as large under v′i as under vi, i.e.,
v′i(xi(θ
′
i, θ−i)) − v
′
i(xi(θi, θ−i)) ≥ vi(xi(θ
′
i, θ−i)) − vi(xi(θi, θ−i)). We show that this is also
true for mechanisms that respect the publicly known budget limits.3
Proposition 1. If a mechanism M = (x, p) for multi-dimensional valuations and either
divisible or indivisible items that respects the publicly known budget limits is IC, then it
satisfies WMON.
Deterministic Mechanisms for Divisible Items. We prove the impossibility result
by analyzing a setting with two agents and two items. This restriction is without loss
of generality as the impossibility result for an arbitrary number of agents n > 2 and an
arbitrary number of items m > 2 follows by setting vi,j = 0 if i > 2 or j > 2. In our
impossibility proof agent 2 is not budget restricted (i.e., b2 > v2,1 + v2,2). Agents can lie
when they report their valuations, and it is not sufficient to study a single input to prove
the impossibility. Hence, we study the outcome for three related cases, namely Case 1
where v1,1 < v2,1 and v1,2 < v2,2; Case 2 where v1,1 > v2,1, v1,2 < v2,2, and b1 > v1,1;
and Case 3 where v1,1 > v2,1, v1,2 > v2,2, and additionally, b1 > v1,1, v1,1v2,2 > v1,2v2,1,
and v2,1 + v2,2 > b1. We give a partial characterization of those cases, which allows us to
analyze the rational behavior of the agents.
Case 1 is easy: Agent 2 is not budget restricted and has the highest valuations for
both items; so he will get both items. Thus the utility for agent 1 is zero. Based on this
observation Case 2 can be analyzed: Agent 1 has the higher valuation for item 1, while
agent 2 has the higher valuation for item 2. Thus, agent 1 gets item 1 and agent 2 gets
item 2. Since the only difference to Case 1 is that in Case 2 v1,1 > v2,1 while in Case 1
v1,1 < v2,1, the critical value whether agent 2 gets item 1 or not is v2,1. Thus, in every IC
mechanism, agent 1 has to pay v2,1 and has utility v1,1 − v2,1. The details of these proofs
can be found in Appendix B. Using these observations we are able to exactly characterize
the allocation produced in Case 3 as follows: In Case 3 agent 1 has a higher valuation than
agent 2 for both items, but he does not have enough budget to pay for both fully. First we
show that if agent 1 does not spend his whole budget (p1 < b1) he must fully receive both
items (specifically x1,2 = 1), since if not, he would buy more of them. Additionally, even if
he spent his budget fully (i.e., p1 = b1) his utility ui, which equals x1,1v1,1 + x1,2v1,2 − b1,
must be non-negative. Since b1 > v1,1 this implies that x1,1 must be 1, i.e., he must receive
item 1 fully, and x1,2 must be non-zero.
3Without this restriction we could charge pi > bi from all agents i ∈ N to be IC. This restriction is
satisfied by IR mechanisms to which we will apply this result.
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Lemma 1. Given v1,1 > v2,1, v1,2 > v2,2, b1 > v1,1, and v1,1v2,2 > v1,2v2,1, if p1 < b1 then
x1,1 = 1 and x1,2 = 1, else if p1 = b1 then x1,1 = 1 and x1,2 > 0, in every IR and PO
outcome.
Then we show that actually x1,2 < 1, which, combined with the previous lemma, implies
that p1 = b1. The fact that x1,2 < 1, i.e, that agent 1 does not fully get item 1 and 2 is
not surprising since he does not have enough budget to outbid agent 2 on both items as
b1 < v2,1 + v2,2. However, we are even able to determine the exact value of x1,2, which is
(b1 − v2,1)/v2,2.
Lemma 2. Given b2 > v2,1+ v2,2, v1,1 > v2,1, v1,2 > v2,2, b1 > v1,1, v1,1v2,2 > v1,2v2,1, and
v2,1 + v2,2 > b1, then p1 = b1 and x1,2 = (b1 − v2,1)/v2,2 < 1 in every IR and PO outcome
selected by an IC mechanism.
We combine these characterizations of Case 3 with (a) the WMON property shown in
Proposition 1 and (b) a sophisticated way of the agent to lie: He overstates his value for
item 1 by a value α and understates his value for item 2 by a value 0 < β < α, but by such
small values that Case 3 continues to hold. Thus, by Lemma 1 x2,1 remains 0 (whether the
agent lies or does not), and thus, the WMON condition implies that x2,2 does not increase.
However, by the dependence of x1,2 on v2,1 and v2,2 shown in Lemma 2, x1,2, and thus also
x2,2 changes when agent 2 lies. This gives a contradiction to the assumption that such a
mechanism exists.
Theorem 1. There is no deterministic IC mechanism for divisible items which selects for
any given input with public budgets an IR and PO outcome.
Proof. Let us assume by contradiction that such a mechanism exists and consider an input
for which b2 > v2,1 + v2,2, v1,1 > v2,1, v1,2 > v2,2, b1 > v1,1, v1,1v2,2 > v1,2v2,1, and
v2,1 + v2,2 > b1 holds. Such an input exists, for example v1,1 = 4, v1,2 = 5, v2,1 = 3, and
v2,2 = 4 with budgets b1 = 5 and b2 = 8 would be such an input. Lemma 1 and 2 imply
that x1,1 = 1, x2,1 = 0, x1,2 =
b1−v2,1
v2,2
, x2,2 = 1 − x1,2, and p1 = b1. Let us consider an
alternative valuation by agent 2. We define v′2,1 = v2,1+α and v
′
2,2 = v2,2−β for arbitrary
α, β > 0 and α > β which are sufficiently small such that v1,1v
′
2,2 > v1,2v
′
2,1 holds. By
Proposition 1, IC implies WMON, and therefore, x′2,2v
′
2,2 − x2,2v
′
2,2 ≥ x
′
2,2v2,2 − x2,2v2,2.
It follows that x2,2 ≥ x
′
2,2, and by Lemma 2,
b1−v2,1
v2,2
≤
b1−v′2,1
v′
2,2
. Hence, the budget of
agent 1 has to be large enough, such that b1 ≥
v2,2v
′
2,1−v2,1v
′
2,2
v2,2−v′2,2
=
v2,1β+v2,2α
β
> v2,1 + v2,2,
but b1 < v2,1 + v2,2 holds by assumption. Contradiction!
Randomized Mechanisms for Divisible and Indivisible Items. We exploit the
fact that randomized mechanisms for both divisible and indivisible items are essentially
equivalent to deterministic mechanisms for divisible items.
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We show that for agents with budget constraints every randomized mechanism M¯ =
(x¯, p¯) for divisible or indivisible items can be mapped bidirectionally to a deterministic
mechanism M = (x, p) for divisible items with identical expected utility for all the agents
and the auctioneer when the same reported types are used as input. To turn a randomized
mechanism for indivisible items into a deterministic mechanism for divisible items simply
compute the expected values of pi and xi,j for all i and j and return them. To turn a deter-
ministic mechanism for divisible items into a randomized mechanism for indivisible items
simply pick values with probability xi,j and keep the same payment as the deterministic
mechanism.
Proposition 2. Every randomized mechanism M¯ = (x¯, p¯) for agents with finite bud-
gets, a rational auctioneer, and a limited amount of divisible or indivisible items can be
mapped bidirectionally to a deterministic mechanism M = (x, p) for divisible items such
that ui(xi(θ
′), pi(θ
′), θi) = E [ui(x¯i(θ
′), p¯i(θ
′), θi)] and
∑
i∈N pi(θ
′) = E [
∑
i∈N p¯i(θ
′)] for all
agents i, all true types θ = (v, b), and reported types θ′ = (v′, b′).
Proof. Let us map M¯ = (x¯, p¯) to M = (x, p) that assigns for each agent i ∈ N and item
j ∈M a fraction of E [x¯i,j ] of item j to agent i, and makes each agent i ∈ N pay E [p¯i]. The
expectations exist since the feasible fractions of items and the feasible payments have an
upper bound and a lower bound. For the other direction, we mapM = (x, p) to M¯ = (x¯, p¯)
that randomly picks for each item j ∈ M an agent i ∈ N to which it assigns item j in a
way such that agent i is picked with probability xi,j, and makes each agent i ∈ N pay pi.
Since x = E [x¯] and p = E [p¯],
∑
j∈M(xi,jvi,j) − pi = E [
∑
j∈M(x¯i,jvi,j) − p¯i] for all i ∈ N
and
∑
i∈N pi = E [
∑
i∈N p¯i].
This proposition implies the non-existence of randomized mechanisms stated in Theo-
rem 2.
Theorem 2. There can be no randomized mechanism for divisible or indivisible items that
is IR ex interim, PO ex interim, and IC ex interim, and that satisfies the public budget
constraint ex post.
Proof. For a contradiction suppose that there is such a randomized mechanism. Then,
by Proposition 2, there must be a deterministic mechanism for divisible items and public
budgets that satisfies IR, PO, and IC. This gives a contradiction to Theorem 1.
4 Single-Dimensional Valuations
In this section we present exact characterizations of PO outcomes and mechanisms that are
IC with public budgets. We characterize PO by a simpler “no trade” condition and, similar
to Section 3, we extend the “classic” characterization results for IC mechanisms for single-
dimensional valuations (see, e.g., [11, 1]) without budgets to settings with public budgets.
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We use these characterizations to show that there can be no deterministic mechanism for
divisible items that is IR, PO, and IC with public budgets. We also present a reduction
to the setting with a single (and thus homogeneous) item that allows us to apply the
following proposition from [4]. The basic building block of the mechanisms mentioned in
this proposition is the “adaptive clinching auction” for a single divisible item. It is described
for two agents in [7], as a “continuous time process” for arbitrarily many agents in [4], and
as an explicit polynomial-time algorithm for arbitrarily many agents in Appendix E.
Proposition 3 ([4]). For a single divisible item there exists a deterministic mechanism
that satisfies IR, NPT, PO, and IC for public budgets. Additionally, for a single divisible
or indivisible item there exists a randomized mechanism that satisfies IR ex interim, NPT
ex post, PO ex post, and IC ex interim for private budgets.
Exact Characterizations of PO and IC. We start by characterizing PO outcomes
through a simpler “no trade” condition. Outcome (x, p) for single-dimensional valuations
and either divisible or indivisible items that respects the budget limits satisfies no trade
(NT) if (a)
∑
i∈N xi,j = 1 for all j ∈ M , and (b) there is no x
′ such that for δi =∑
j∈M(x
′
i,j −xi,j)αj for all i ∈ N , W = {i ∈ N | δi > 0}, and L = {i ∈ N | δi ≤ 0} we have∑
i∈N δivi > 0 and
∑
i∈W min(bi−pi, δivi)+
∑
i∈L δivi ≥ 0.
4 This definition says that there
should be no alternative assignment that overall increases the sum of the valuations, and
allows the “winners” to compensate the “losers”. It differs from the definitions in prior
work in that it allows trades that involve both items and money. We will exploit this fact
in the proof of our impossibility result.
Proposition 4. Outcome (x, p) for single-dimensional valuations and either divisible or
indivisible items that respects the budget limits is PO if and only if it satisfies NT.
Next we characterize mechanisms that are IC with public budgets by “value mono-
tonicity” and “payment identity”. MechanismM = (x, p) for single-dimensional valuations
and indivisible items that respects the publicly known budgets satisfies value monotonic-
ity (VM) if for all i ∈ N , θi = (vi, bi), θ
′
i = (v
′
i, bi), and θ−i = (v−i, b−i) we have that
vi ≤ v
′
i implies
∑
j∈M xi,j(θi, θ−i)αj ≤
∑
j∈M xi,j(θ
′
i, θ−i)αj . Mechanism M = (x, p) for
single-dimensional valuations and indivisible items that respects the publicly known bud-
gets satisfies payment identity (PI) if for all i ∈ N and θ = (v, b) with cγt ≤ vi ≤ cγt+1
we have pi(θ) = pi((0, bi), θ−i) +
∑t
s=1(γs − γs−1)cγs(bi, θ−i), where γ0 < γ1 < . . . are
the values
∑
j∈M xi,jαj can take and cγs(bi, θ−i) for 1 ≤ s ≤ t are the corresponding
critical valuations. While VM ensures that stating a higher valuation can only lead to a
better allocation, PI gives a formula for the payment in terms of the possible allocations
and the critical valuations. In the proof of our impossibility result we will use the fact
4For PO we only need that the outcome respects the reported budget limits. Hence our characterization
also applies in private budget settings.
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that the payments for worse allocations provide a lower bound on the payments for better
allocations.
Proposition 5. Mechanism M = (x, p) for single-dimensional valuations and indivisible
items that respects the publicly known budgets is IC if and only if it satisfies VM and PI.
Deterministic Mechanisms for Indivisible Items. The proof of our impossibility
result uses the characterizations of PO outcomes and mechanisms that are IC with public
budgets as follows: (a) PO is characterized by NT and NT induces a lower bound on the
agents’ payments for a specific assignment, namely for the case that agent 1 only gets item
m. (b) IC, in turn, is characterized by VM and PI. Now VM and PI can be used to extend
the lower bound on the payments for the specific assignment to all possible assignments. (c)
Finally, IR implies upper bounds on the payments that, with a suitable choice of valuations,
conflict with the lower bounds on the payments induced by NT, VM, and PI.
Theorem 3. For single-dimensional valuations, indivisible items, and public budgets there
can be no deterministic mechanism M = (x, p) that satisfies IR, PO, and IC.
Proof. For a contradiction suppose that there is a mechanism M = (x, p) that is IR, PO,
and IC for all n and all m. Consider a setting with n = 2 agents and m = 2 items in which
v1 > v2 > 0 and b1 > α1v2.
Observe that if agent 1’s valuation was v′1 = 0 and he reported his valuation truthfully,
then sinceM satisfies IR his utility would be u1((0, b1), θ−1, (0, b1)) = −p1((0, b1), θ−1) ≥ 0.
This shows that p1((0, b1), θ−1) ≤ 0.
By PO, which by Proposition 4 is characterized by NT, agent 1 with valuation v1 > v2
and budget b1 > α1v2 must win at least one item because otherwise he could buy any item
from agent 2 and compensate him for his loss.
PO, respectively NT, also implies that agent 1’s payment for item 2 must be strictly
larger than b1 − (α1 − α2)v2 because otherwise he could trade item 2 against item 1 and
compensate agent 2 for his loss.
By IC, which by Proposition 5 is characterized by VM and PI, agent 1’s payment
for item 2 is given by p1({2}) = p1((0, b1), θ−1) + α2cα2(b1, θ−1), where cα2 is the critical
valuation for winning item 2. Together with p1({2}) > b1 − (α1 − α2)v2 this shows that
cα2(b1, θ−1) > (1/α2)[b1 − (α1 − α2)v2 − p1((0, b1), θ−1)].
IC, respectively VM and PI, also imply that agent 1’s payment for any non-empty
set of items S in terms of the fractions γt =
∑
j∈S αj > · · · > γ1 = α2 > γ0 = 0 and
corresponding critical valuations cγt(b1, θ−1) ≥ · · · ≥ cγ1(b1, θ−1) = cα2(b1, θ−1) is p1(S) =
p1((0, b1), θ−1) +
∑t
s=1(γs − γs−1)cγs(b1, θ−1). Because cγs(b1, θ−1) ≥ cα2(b1, θ−1) for all s
and
∑t
s=1(γs−γs−1) =
∑
j∈S αj we obtain p1(S) ≥ p1((0, b1), θ−1)+(
∑
j∈S αj)cα2(b1, θ−1).
Combining this lower bound on p1(S) with the lower bound on cα2(b1, θ−1) shows that
p1(S) > (
∑
j∈S αj/α2)[b1 − (α1 − α2)v2].
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For v1 such that (1/α2)[b1 − (α1 − α2)v2] > v1 > v2 we know that agent 1 must win
some item, but for any non-empty set of items S the lower bound on agent 1’s payment
for S contradicts IR.
Randomized Mechanisms for Indivisible and Divisible Items. Interestingly, the
impossibility result for deterministic mechanisms for indivisible items can be avoided by a
randomized mechanism: (a) Apply the randomized mechanism for a single indivisible item
of [4] to a single indivisible item for which agent i ∈ N has valuation v˜i =
∑
j∈M αjvi. (b)
Map the single-item outcome (x˜, p˜) into an outcome (x, p) for the multi-item setting by
setting xi,j = 1 for all j ∈M if and only if x˜i = 1 and setting pi = p˜i for all i ∈ N .
A similar idea works for divisible items. The only difference is that we use the mech-
anisms of [4] for a single divisible item, and map the single-item outcome (x˜, p˜) into a
multi-item outcome by setting xi,j = x˜i for all i ∈ N and all j ∈M and setting pi = p˜i for
all i ∈ N.
The main difficulty in proving that the resulting mechanisms inherit the properties of
the mechanisms in [4] is to show that the resulting mechanisms satisfy PO (ex post). For
this we argue that a certain structural property of the single-item outcomes is preserved
by the mapping to the multi-item setting and remains to be sufficient for PO (ex post).
Proposition 6. Let (x¯, p¯) be the outcome of our mechanism and let (x, p) be the outcome of
the respective mechanism of [4], then ui(x¯i, p¯i) = ui(xi, pi) for all i ∈ N resp. E[ui(x¯i, p¯i)] =
E[ui(xi, pi)] for all i ∈ N .
Theorem 4. For single-dimensional valuations, divisible or indivisible items, and private
budgets there is a randomized mechanism that satisfies IR ex interim, NPT ex post, PO ex
post, and IC ex interim. Additionally, for single-dimensional valuations and divisible items
there is a deterministic mechanism that satisfies IR, NPT, PO, and IC for public budgets.
Proof. IR (ex interim) and IC (ex interim) follow from Proposition 6 and the fact that the
mechanisms of [4] are IR (ex interim) and IC (ex interim). NPT (ex post) follows from the
fact that the payments in our mechanisms and the mechanisms of [4] are the same, and the
mechanisms in [4] satisfy NPT (ex post). For PO (ex post) we argue that the structural
property of the outcomes of the mechanisms in [4] that (a)
∑
i∈N x˜i,j = 1 for all j ∈ M
and (b)
∑
j∈M x˜i,j > 0 and v˜i′ > v˜i imply p˜i′ = bi′ is preserved by the mapping to the
multi-item setting and remains to be sufficient for PO (ex post).
We begin by showing that the structural property is preserved by the mapping. For
this observe that
∑
i∈N x˜i,j = 1 for all j ∈M implies that
∑
i∈N xi,j = 1 for all j ∈M and
that
∑
j∈M x˜i,j > 0 and v˜i′ > v˜i imply p˜i′ = bi′ implies that
∑
j∈M xi,j > 0 and vi′ > vi
imply pi′ = bi′ .
Next we show that the structural property remains to be sufficient for PO (ex post).
For this assume by contradiction that the outcome (x, p) is not PO (ex post). Then, by
Proposition 4, there exists an x′ such that
∑
i∈N δivi > 0 and
∑
i∈W min(bi − pi, δivi) +
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∑
i∈L δivi ≥ 0, where δi =
∑
j∈M(x
′
i,j − xi,j)αj , W = {i ∈ N | δi > 0}, and L = {i ∈ N |
δi ≤ 0}.
Because (x, p) satisfies condition (a), i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi,j = 1 for all j ∈ M , and x
′ is a
valid assignment, i.e.,
∑
i∈N x
′
i,j ≤ 1 for all j ∈M , we have
∑
i∈N δi =
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N (x
′
i,j −
xi,j)αj ≤ 0. Because
∑
i∈N δivi > 0 we have
∑
i∈W δivi ≥
∑
i∈N δivi > 0 and, thus,∑
i∈W δi > 0. We conclude that
∑
i∈L δi =
∑
i∈N δi−
∑
i∈W δi < 0 and, thus,
∑
i∈L δivi < 0.
Because (x, p) satisfies condition (b), i.e.,
∑
j∈M xi,j > 0 and vi′ > vi imply pi′ = bi′ ,
there exists a t with 1 ≤ t ≤ n such that (1)
∑
j∈M xi,j ≥ 0 and pi = bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, (2)∑
j∈M xi,j ≥ 0 and pi ≤ bi for i = t+1, and (3)
∑
j∈M xi,j = 0 and pi ≤ bi for t+2 ≤ i ≤ n.
Case 1: t = n. Then
∑
i∈W min(bi − pi, δivi) = 0 and, thus,
∑
i∈W min(bi − pi, δivi) +∑
i∈L δivi < 0.
Case 2: t < n andW ∩{1, . . . , t} = ∅. Then
∑
i∈W δivi ≤
∑
i∈W δivt+1 and
∑
i∈L δivi ≤∑
i∈L δivt+1 and, thus,
∑
i∈N δivi =
∑
i∈W δivi +
∑
i∈L δivi ≤
∑
i∈N δivt+1 ≤ 0.
Case 3: t < n andW∩{1, . . . , t} 6= ∅. Then
∑
i∈W min(pi−bi, δivi) ≤
∑
i∈W\{1..t} δivt+1
and
∑
i∈L δivi ≤
∑
i∈L δivt+1 and, thus,
∑
i∈W min(pi − bi, δivi) +
∑
i∈L δivi ≤ (
∑
i∈N δi −∑
i∈W∩{1,...,t} δi)vt+1 < 0.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we analyzed IR, PO, and IC mechanisms for settings with heterogeneous
items. Our main accomplishments are: (a) An impossibility result for randomized mecha-
nisms and public budgets for additive valuations. (b) Randomized mechanisms that achieve
these properties for private budgets and a restricted class of additive valuations. We are
able to circumvent the impossibility result in the restricted setting because our argument
for the impossibility result is based on the ability of an agent to overstate his valuation for
one and understate his valuation for another item, which is not possible in the restricted
setting. A promising direction for future work is to identify other valuations for which this
is the case.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Fix i ∈ N and θ−i = (v−i, b−i). By IC agent i does not benefit from reporting θ
′
i = (v
′
i, bi)
when his true type is θi = (vi, bi), nor does he benefit from reporting θi = (vi, bi) when his
true type is θ′i = (v
′
i, bi). Thus,
vi(x(θi, θ−i))− pi(θi, θ−i) ≥ vi(x(θ
′
i, θ−i))− pi(θ
′
i, θ−i)
v′i(x(θ
′
i, θ−i))− pi(θ
′
i, θ−i) ≥ v
′
i(x(θi, θ−i))− pi(θi, θ−i)
By combining these inequalities we get
v′i(xi(θ
′
i, θ−i))− v
′
i(xi(θi, θ−i)) ≥ vi(xi(θ
′
i, θ−i))− vi(xi(θi, θ−i)).
B Analysis of Cases 1 and 2 in Section 3
We start the analysis with an auxiliary lemma that shows that if at least one agent i ∈ N
has a positive valuation for some item j ∈M then this item j must be assigned completely
in every outcome that is IR and PO.
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Lemma 3. If the valuation of at least one agent for an item j ∈ M is positive, then an
IR and PO outcome assigns all of item j, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 xi,j = 1.
Proof. Let us assume by contradiction that we have an outcome (x, p) in which not all
of the fractions of item j are assigned to the agents. Then the utility of the agents who
have a positive valuation strictly increases when they get the unsold fractions of item j at
price 0, while the utility of the other agents and that of the auctioneer remain unchanged.
Contradiction to PO!
Case 1 is easy: Agent 2 is not budget restricted and has the highest valuations for both
items; so he will get both items. Thus in this case the utility for agent 1 is zero.
Lemma 4. Given b2 > v2,1 + v2,2, v2,1 > v1,1 and v2,2 > v1,2, then x1,1 = 0, x1,2 = 0,
x2,1 = 1, x2,2 = 1, and u1 = 0 in every IR and PO outcome selected by an IC mechanism.
Proof. We divide the proof into the following parts: in (a) we show that x1,1 = 0, x1,2 = 0,
x2,1 = 1, and x2,2 = 1, and in (b) we show that u1 = 0.
(a) Let us assume by contradiction that we have an IR and PO outcome where x1,1 > 0
or x1,2 > 0. IR requires that p2 ≤ x2,1v2,1 + x2,2v2,2. Hence, agent 2 can buy the
fractions x1,1 of item 1 and x1,2 of item 2 for a payment p with x1,1v2,1 + x1,2v2,2 >
p ≥ x1,1v1,1 + x1,2v1,2 from agent 1. Because of v2,1 > v1,1 and v2,2 > v1,2 such a
payment exists and agent 2 has enough money, since b2 > v2,1 + v2,2 implies
b2 > v2,1 + v2,2 = (x1,1 + x2,1)v2,1 + (x1,2 + x2,2)v2,2 > p2 + p. (1)
The utility of agent 2 would increase and the utilities of agent 1 and the auctioneer
would not decrease. Contradiction to PO!
(b) We have already shown before that agent 1 gets no fraction of the items, and therefore,
IR implies that his payments cannot be positive.
Let us consider the subcase where v1,1 = v1,2 = 0 and agent 1 reports truthfully.
The valuations of agent 2 are positive. Because of IR the payment of agent 2 cannot
exceed his reported valuation, but (a) holds when his reported valuations are posi-
tive. Therefore, agent 2 would have an incentive to understate his valuation when his
payment would be positive. Hence, IR of the auctioneer implies that the payment of
both agents is equal to 0. This means, that the utility of agent 1 is 0 in this case.
If there would exist any other reported valuation of agent 1, where he gets no items,
but where his payments are negative, then he would have an incentive to lie, when his
valuations are equal to 0. This would contradict IC!
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In Case 2, agent 1 has the higher valuation for item 1, while agent 2 has the higher
valuation for item 2. Thus, agent 1 gets item 1 and agent 2 gets item 2. Since the only
difference to Case 1 is that in Case 2 v1,1 > v2,1 while in Case 1 v1,1 < v2,1, the critical
value whether agent 2 gets item 1 or not is v2,1, and thus in every IC mechanism, agent 1
has to pay v2,1 and his utility is v1,1 − v2,1.
Lemma 5. Given b2 > v2,1 + v2,2, v1,1 > v2,1, v2,2 > v1,2, and b1 > v1,1, then x1,1 = 1,
x1,2 = 0, x2,1 = 0, x2,2 = 1, and u1 = v1,1 − v2,1 in every IR and PO outcome selected by
an IC mechanism.
Proof. We divide the proof into the following parts: in (a) we show that x1,1 = 1, x1,2 = 0,
x2,1 = 0, and x2,2 = 1, and in (b) we show that u1 = v1,1 − v2,1.
(a) Let us assume by contradiction that x1,2 > 0. Then, agent 2 can buy these fractions of
item 2 for a payment p with x1,2v2,2 > p ≥ x1,2v1,2, which exists because of v2,2 > v1,2.
IR and b2 > v2,1+ v2,2 ensure that agent 2 has enough budget, since b2 > v2,1+ v2,2 =
(x1,1 + x2,1)v2,1 + (x1,2 + x2,2)v2,2 ≥ p2 + x1,1v2,1 + x1,2v2,2 > p2 + p. The utility of
the agent 2 would increase, while the utilities of agent 1 and the auctioneer would not
decrease. Contradiction to PO!
Otherwise, let us assume that x1,1 < 1 and x1,2 = 0. Then, agent 1 can buy the
other fractions of item 1 for a payment p with x2,1v1,1 > p ≥ x2,1v2,1, which exists
because of v1,1 > v2,1. IR and b1 > v1,1 ensure that agent 1 has enough budget,
since b1 > v1,1 = (x1,1 + x2,1)v1,1 ≥ p1 + x2,1v1,1 > p1 + p. The utility of agent 1
would increase, while the utilities of agent 2 and the auctioneer would not decrease.
Contradiction to PO!
(b) We show first that p1 ≤ v2,1. Since x1,1 = 1 and x1,2 = 0, IR requires that p1 ≤ v1,1.
If p1 > v2,1, then agent 1 has an incentive to lie. If he states that his valuation for
item 1 is v′1,1 with p1 > v
′
1,1 > v2,1, then the allocation of the items does not change,
but he pays less because of IR. Contradiction to IC!
Now, we show that p1 ≥ v2,1. Let us therefore assume by contradiction that p1 < v2,1.
If we have v′1,1 with p1 < v
′
1,1 < v2,1 instead of v1,1, and all the other valuations are
left unchanged, then Lemma 4 implies that u′1 = 0. Hence, in this case agent 1 can
increase his utility when he lies and states that his valuation is v1,1, because his utility
would be v′1,1 − p1 > 0. Contradiction to IC!
Since agent 1 gets all fractions of item 1, no fraction of item 2, and has to pay v2,1,
his utility is v1,1 − v2,1.
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C Proof of Lemma 1
We divide the proof into the following parts: in (a) we show that x1,1 = 1 and x1,2 = 1
if p1 < b1, in (b) we show that x1,2 > (1 − x1,1)
v2,1
v2,2
if p1 = b1, and in (c) we show that
x1,1 = 1 and x1,2 > 0 if p1 = b1.
(a) Let us assume by contradiction that p1 < b1 and x1,j < 1 for an item j ∈ {1, 2}.
Agent 1 can increase his utility by buying min{ b1−p1
p
, x2,j} fractions of item j for a unit
price p with v1,j > p ≥ v2,j from agent 2. Such a price exists, because of v1,1 > v2,1 and
v1,2 > v2,2. Agent 1 has enough money for the trade, since p1 + pmin{
b1−p1
p
, x2,j} =
min{b1, p1 + px2,j} ≤ b1. The utility of agent 1 would increase, and the utilities of
agent 2 and the auctioneer would not decrease. Contradiction to PO!
(b) IR requires b1 = p1 ≤ v1,1x1,1 + v1,2x1,2, and therefore, x1,2 ≥
b1−v1,1x1,1
v1,2
. If x1,1 = 1,
then b1 > v1,1 implies that (1 − x1,1)
v2,1
v2,2
= 0 <
b1−v1,1
v1,2
=
b1−v1,1x1,1
v1,2
. Otherwise, if
x1,1 = 0, then b1 > v1,1 and v1,1v2,2 > v1,2v2,1 imply that (1−x1,1)
v2,1
v2,2
=
v2,1
v2,2
< b1
v1,2
=
b1−v1,1x1,1
v1,2
, and hence, (1 − x1,1)
v2,1
v2,2
<
b1−v1,1x1,1
v1,2
for all x1,1 ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, we
have that (1 − x1,1)
v2,1
v2,2
< x1,2 for all possible values of x1,1.
(c) We split the proof into two parts. We assume by contradiction that either p1 = b1,
x1,1 ≤ 1 and x1,2 = 0, or that p1 = b1, x1,1 < 1 and x1,2 > 0.
Let us assume that p1 = b1, x1,1 ≤ 1 and x1,2 = 0. According to b1 > v1,1, the utility
of agent 1 is negative. Contradiction to IR!
We will now investigate the other case and assume that p1 = b1, x1,1 < 1 and x1,2 > 0.
Agent 2 has the same valuation for x1,2 = 1−x1,1 fractions of item 1 and (1−x1,1)
v2,1
v2,2
fractions of item 2. The valuation of agent 1 for (1 − x1,1)
v2,1
v2,2
fractions of item 2
is identical to the valuation for (1 − x1,1)
v2,1v1,2
v2,2v1,1
fractions of item 1. We know that
v2,1v1,2 < v2,2v1,1. That is, that the utility of agent 1 is increased and the utilities
of agent 2 and the auctioneer are not decreased, when agent 1 trades (1 − x1,1)
v2,1
v2,2
fractions of item 2 against x2,1 = 1 − x1,1 fractions of item 1. Fact (b) implies that
agent 1 actually has the required (1 − x1,1)
v2,1
v2,2
fractions of item 2. Contradiction to
PO!
D Proof of Lemma 2
We divide the proof into the following parts: in (a) we show that p1 = b1 and x1,2 < 1, in
(b) we show that
b1−v2,1
v2,2
≥ x1,2 ≥
b1−v2,1
v1,2
, and in (c) we show that x1,2 =
b1−v2,1
v2,2
.
(a) Lemma 1 implies that the utility of agent 1 is v1,1 + x1,2v1,2 − p1. We know that
v2,1+v2,2 > b1. Hence, we can select a sufficiently small ǫ > 0 such that v2,1+v2,2−ǫ >
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b1. Because of v1,1 > v2,1 and b1 > v1,1, we know that v2,2 − ǫ > 0. Let us consider
the case where we have v′1,2 with v2,2 > v
′
1,2 > v2,2 − ǫ instead of v1,2 and all other
valuation are left unchanged. In this case, the utility of agent 1 is v1,1 − v2,1, because
of Lemma 5 and since v2,2 > v
′
1,2 holds. Therefore, IC implies that
v1,1 − v2,1 ≥ v1,1 + x1,2v
′
1,2 − p1. (2)
Let us assume by contradiction that x1,2 = 1, then equation (2) implies
p1 ≥ v2,1 + v
′
1,2 > v2,1 + v2,2 − ǫ > b1, (3)
which contradicts the budget constraint. Therefore, x1,2 < 1, and hence, Lemma 1
implies that p1 = b1.
(b) Lemma 1 and (a) show that the utility of agent 1 is v1,1 + x1,2v1,2 − b1. We select
a sufficiently small ǫ > 0, such that v2,1 + v2,2 − ǫ > b1 and consider the case where
v′1,2 = v2,2 − ǫ and all other valuations are unchanged. Lemma 5 implies that the
utility of agent 1 is v1,1 − v2,1 in this case. Hence, IC implies that
v1,1 − v2,1 ≥ v1,1 + x1,2v
′
1,2 − b1 (4)
and
v1,1 + x1,2v1,2 − b1 ≥ v1,1 − v2,1. (5)
Inequality (4) implies that
b1−v2,1
v2,2−ǫ
=
b1−v2,1
v′
1,2
≥ x1,2. Since this inequality has to hold
for all sufficiently small ǫ > 0, we know that
b1−v2,1
v2,2
≥ x1,2. Inequality (5) implies that
b1−v2,1
v1,2
≤ x1,2.
(c) Let us assume by contradiction that the inequality
b1−v2,1
v2,2
≥ x1,2 implied by (b) is
strict, and γ > 0 is defined such that
b1−v2,1
v2,2
= x1,2+ γ. We select arbitrary ǫ > 0 and
δ with v2,2
(
b1−v2,1
b1−v2,1−γv2,2
− 1
)
> δ > 0 which fulfill v1,2− ǫ− δ = v2,2. Such variables ǫ
and δ exist because of v1,2 > v2,2, and since v1,1 > v2,1, b1 > v1,1 and γ > 0 imply that
b1−v2,1
b1−v2,1−γv2,2
> 1. We consider the alternative case where v′1,2 = v1,2 − ǫ and all other
valuations are unchanged. In this case, (b) implies that
b1−v2,1
v′
1,2
≤ x′1,2, and hence,
b1−v2,1
v2,2+δ
≤ x′1,2. Furthermore, Lemma 1 and (a) imply that p1 = b1 and x1,1 = 1 in
both cases. Now, IC requires that
v1,1 + x1,2v1,2 − b1 ≥ v1,1 + x
′
1,2v1,2 − b1, (6)
respectively x1,2 ≥ x
′
1,2, and therefore,
b1−v2,1
v2,2
− γ ≥
b1−v2,1
v2,2+δ
. But this inequality can
be transformed to δ ≥ v2,2
(
b1−v2,1
b1−v2,1−γv2,2
− 1
)
. Contradiction!
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E Adaptive Clinching Auction for a Single Divisible Item
We investigate the adaptive clinching auction for a single divisible item that is described as
a “continuous time process” in [4] in order to construct an explicit algorithm. In Step (II)
of the differential process described in [4] the item is overdemanded and no bidder exits the
auction because his valuation is identical to the current price. This is the case which has to
be analyzed. We consider a time span [t1, t2]. A is the set of active bidders at time t1 and
C is the set of clinching bidders at time t1. For all t ∈ [t1, t2] we have p(t) = p(t1)+(t− t1).
We assume that t2 is selected such that vi > p(t) for all i ∈ A and t ∈ [t1, t2). Therefore,
the set of active bidders at time t ∈ [t1, t2) is equal to A and the set of exiting bidders at
time t ∈ [t1, t2) is empty. We assume further that t2 is selected such that no bidder starts
clinching during (t1, t2), and that the demand D(t) =
∑
i∈A
bi(t)
p(t) is larger than the supply
S(t) for all t ∈ [t1, t2). Hence, at every time t in (t1, t2) Step (II) of the process is selected
and the set of clinching bidders C does not change.
Consider time t in (t1, t2). By the definition of the clinching bidders the supply is given
by S(t) =
∑
j∈A\{i}
bj(t)
p(t) for all t ∈ (t1, t2) and every clinching bidder i ∈ C. Since every
clinching bidder i ∈ C gets the same fraction allocated during (t1, t) we have
xi(t)− xi(t1) =
S(t1)− S(t)
|C|
=
1
|C|
∑
j∈A\{i}
(
bj(t1)
p(t1)
−
bj(t)
p(t)
)
.
Let us now differentiate this equation with respect to t. We get
x′i(t) =
1
|C|
∑
j∈A\{i}
(
−
b′j(t)p(t)− bj(t)p
′(t)
p(t)2
)
=
1
|C|
∑
j∈A\{i}
(
bj(t)
p(t)2
−
b′j(t)
p(t)
)
.
Bidder i ∈ C pays p(t) for the fractions that he is clinching at time t. Hence b′i(t) =
−x′i(t)p(t). This, the previous equality, b
′
j(t) = 0 for j ∈ A \ C, and b
′
j(t) = b
′
i(t) and
bj(t) = bi(t) for j ∈ C \ {i} implies
b′i(t) = −
∑
j∈A\{i}
bj(t)
p(t)
=
−
∑
j∈A\C bj(t1)− (|C| − 1)bi(t)
p(t1)− t1 + t
.
For the case that |C| > 1 we can solve this differential equation and obtain
bi(t) =
1
|C| − 1

(p(t1)
p(t)
)|C|−1 ∑
j∈A\{i}
bj(t1)−
∑
j∈A\C
bj(t1)

 .
Since bj(t) = bj(t1) for all j ∈ A \ C and bj(t) = bi(t) for all j ∈ C it follows that
|C|−1
√∑
j∈A\{i} bj(t1)∑
j∈A\{i} bj(t)
=
p(t)
p(t1)
. (7)
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For the case that |C| = 1 we have
b′i(t) = −
∑
j∈A\{i} bj(t1)
p(t1)− t1 + t
and obtain
exp
(
bi(t1)− bi(t)∑
j∈A\{i} bj(t1)
)
=
p(t)
p(t1)
. (8)
Equations (7) and (8) allow us to compute the prices where a new bidder would start
clinching.
The construction of the algorithm follows the differential process described in [4]. Lines
28-35 of Algorithm 1 correspond to Step (I) in [4]; lines 13-23 of Algorithm 1 correspond
to Step (III) in [4]; and Algorithm 2, which is called on line 10 of Algorithm 1 corresponds
to Step (II) in [4]. Line 16, 20, and 22 of Algorithm 2 follow from equation (7) and (8).
The variables that are used in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are described in Table 3.
For the running time observe that each time one of the two while-loops gets executed
either an active bidder who was not clinching becomes a clinching bidder or an active
bidder becomes an exiting bidder. Since an exiting bidder cannot become active again and
an active clinching bidder cannot become an active non-clinching bidder again it follows
that the algorithm runs in time polynomial in the bidders.
Table 3: Description of the Variables in Algorithm 1
Variable Data Type Constraint Description
n integer (constant) n > 1 number of bidders
b real vector (length n) bi > 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} budgets
v real vector (length n) vi > 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} valuations
A set of integers A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} set of active bidders
E set of integers E ⊆ {1, . . . , n} set of exiting bidders
C set of integers C ⊆ {1, . . . , n} set of clinching bidders
p real p ≥ 0 price
x real vector (length n) xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} allocated amount
S real S ≥ 0 supply
D real D ≥ 0 aggregated demand
Algorithm 1 Adaptive Clinching Auction for a Single Divisible Good.
1: procedure Clinching(n, b, v)
2: \\ initialize variables
3: (p, S,D)← (0, 1,∞)
4: (A,E,C)← ({1, . . . , n}, ∅, ∅)
5: xi ← 0 ∀i ∈ A
6: while D > S do
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Algorithm 1 Adaptive Clinching Auction for a Single Divisible Good (Continued).
7: \\ item is overdemanded
8: if E = ∅ then
9: \\ there are no exiting bidders
10: (A,E,C, p, S,D, x, b)← ContinuousClinching(A,C, p, S,D, x, b, v)
11: else
12: \\ there are exiting bidders
13: m←
∑
i∈E bi
14: E ← ∅
15: while m > 0 do
16: \\ compute amount that the clinching bidders can clinch
17: \\ before a new bidder starts clinching
18: c← min{|C|(mini∈C bi −maxi∈A\C bi),m}
19: m← m− c
20: (xi, bi)← (xi +
c
|C|p , bi −
c
|C|) ∀i ∈ C
21: (S,D)← (S − c
p
, D − c
p
)
22: C ← {i ∈ A|D − bi
p
= S}
23: end while
24: end if
25: end while
26: \\ item is not overdemanded
27: \\ sell to active bidders the amount they can afford
28: S ← S −D
29: (xi, bi)← (xi +
bi
p
, 0) ∀i ∈ A
30: \\ sell left fractions to exiting bidders
31: for i ∈ E do
32: m← min{ bi
p
, S}
33: (xi, bi)← (xi +m, bi −mp)
34: S ← S −m
35: end for
36: return (x, b)
37: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Continuous Clinching.
1: procedure ContinuousClinching(A,C, p, S,D, x, b, v)
2: if C = ∅ then
3: \\ compute highest price p where no bidder clinched
4: \\ or exited the auction before
5: p∗ ←
∑
i∈A bi−maxi∈A bi
S
6: p← min{p∗,mini∈A vi}
7: \\ update variables
8: (A,E)← ({i ∈ A|vi > p}, {i ∈ A|vi = p})
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Algorithm 2 Continuous Clinching (Continued).
9: D ←
∑
i∈A bi
p
10: C ← {i ∈ A|D − bi
p
= S}
11: else
12: \\ compute next break point of the differential process
13: \\ and update variables
14: b∗ ← maxj∈A\C bj
15: \\ price where a new bidder would start to clinch
16: p∗ ←


p exp
(
maxi∈Abi−b∗∑
i∈A\C bi
)
, if |C| = 1
p
(
|C|−1
√
pS
(|C|−1)b∗+
∑
i∈A\C bi
)
, if |C| > 1
17: \\ price at the next break point
18: p˜← min{p∗,mini∈A vi}
19: \\ supply at the next break point
20: S˜ ← (p
p˜
)|C|S
21: \\ budget of the clinching bidder at next break point
22: b˜←


maxi∈A bi − log
(
p˜
p
)∑
i∈A\C bi, if |C| = 1
1
|C|−1
(
S p
|C|
p˜|C|−1
−
∑
i∈A\C bi
)
, if |C| > 1
23: \\ update variables
24: (xi, bi)← (xi +
1
|C|(S − S˜), b˜) ∀i ∈ C
25: E ← {i ∈ A|vi = p}
26: A← {i ∈ A|vi > p}
27: C ← argmaxi∈A bi
28: (p, S,D)← (p˜, S˜,
∑
i∈A
bi
p
)
29: end if
30: return (A,E,C, p, S,D, x, b)
31: end procedure
F Proof of Proposition 4
First we show that if (x, p) satisfies PO, then it satisfies NT. To this end we show that if
(x, p) does not satisfy NT, then it is not PO.
Case 1: ¬ NT because ¬ (a)
There exists an item j ∈M such that
∑
i∈N xi,j < 1. By assumption every agent i ∈ N
has vi > 0 and, thus, αjvi > 0. Consider the outcome (x
′, p′) that results from assigning the
unassigned fraction of item j to some agent i′ ∈ N at no additional cost. For this outcome
we have u′i = ui for all agents i ∈ N \ {i
′}, u′i′ > ui′ for agent i
′, and
∑
i∈N p
′
i =
∑
i∈N pi.
Hence (x, p) is not PO.
Case 2: ¬ NT because ¬ (b)
There exists an assignment x′ such that
∑
i∈N δivi > 0 and
∑
i∈W min(bi − pi, δivi) +∑
i∈L δivi ≥ 0. Consider the outcome (x
′, p′) for which p′i = pi + min(bi − pi, δivi) for all
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agents i ∈W and p′i = pi + δivi for all agents i ∈ L.
For all agents i ∈ N we have u′i ≥ ui because
u′i =
∑
j∈M
x′i,jαjvi − p
′
i
=
∑
j∈M
xi,jαjvi + δivi − pi −min(bi − pi, δivi)
≥ ui, for i ∈W , and (9)
u′i =
∑
j∈M
x′i,jαjvi − p
′
i
=
∑
j∈M
xi,jαjvi + δivi − pi − δivi
= ui for i ∈ L.
For the auctioneer we have
∑
i∈N p
′
i ≥
∑
i∈N pi because∑
i∈N
p′i −
∑
i∈N
pi =
∑
i∈W
p′i +
∑
i∈L
p′i −
∑
i∈N
pi
=
∑
i∈W
(pi +min(bi − pi, δivi)) +
∑
i∈L
(pi + δivi)−
∑
i∈N
pi
=
∑
i∈W
min(bi − pi, δivi) +
∑
i∈L
δivi
≥ 0. (10)
If
∑
i∈W min(bi − pi, δivi) +
∑
i∈L δivi > 0, then inequality (10) is strict showing that∑
i∈N p
′
i >
∑
i∈N pi. Otherwise,
∑
i∈W min(bi − pi, δivi) +
∑
i∈L δivi = 0, and since∑
i∈N δivi > 0 we must have bi − pi < δivi for at least one agent i ∈ W . For this agent i
inequality (9) is strict showing that u′i > ui. Hence in both cases (x, p) is not PO.
Next we show that if (x, p) satisfies NT, then it is PO. To this end we show that if (x, p)
is not PO, then it does not satisfy NT. If (x, p) is not PO, then there exists an outcome
(x′, p′) such that u′i ≥ ui for all agents i ∈ N and
∑
i p
′
i ≥
∑
i pi, with at least one of the
inequalities strict.
If not all items are assigned completely in (x, p), then we have ¬ (a) and so (x, p) does
not satisfy NT. Otherwise, if in (x, p) all items are assigned completely, then to show that
(x, p) does not satisfy NT we have to show ¬ (b). To this end consider the assignment
x′ and let δi =
∑
j∈M(x
′
i,j − xi,j)αj for i ∈ N , let W = {i ∈ N | δi > 0}, and let
L = {i ∈ N | δi ≤ 0}.
We begin by showing that
∑
i∈W min(bi − pi, δivi) +
∑
i∈L δivi ≥ 0.
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For i ∈ N we have p′i − pi ≤ min(bi − pi, δivi) because
p′i ≤ bi ⇒ p
′
i − pi ≤ bi − pi, and
u′i ≥ ui ⇒ p
′
i − pi ≤ δivi.
It follows that∑
i∈W
min(bi − pi, δivi) +
∑
i∈L
δivi ≥
∑
i∈W
(p′i − pi) +
∑
i∈L
(p′i − pi)
=
∑
i∈N
p′i −
∑
i∈N
pi ≥ 0.
Next we show that
∑
i∈N δivi > 0.
Since u′i ≥ ui for all i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N p
′
i ≥
∑
i∈N pi we have∑
i∈N
u′i ≥
∑
i∈N
ui ⇔
∑
i∈N
(
∑
j∈M
x′i,jαjvi − p
′
i) ≥
∑
i∈N
(
∑
j∈M
xi,jαjvi − pi)
⇔
∑
i∈N
(
∑
j∈M
(x′i,j − xi,j)αjvi) ≥
∑
i∈N
p′i −
∑
i∈N
pi
⇒
∑
i∈N
δivi ≥
∑
i∈N
p′i −
∑
i∈N
pi ≥ 0. (11)
If u′i > ui for some i ∈ N , then
∑
i∈N u
′
i >
∑
i∈N ui and, thus, the first inequality in
(11) is strict. Otherwise, if
∑
i∈N p
′
i >
∑
i∈N pi, then the second inequality in (11) is strict.
In both cases strictness of the inequality implies that
∑
i∈N δivi > 0.
G Proof of Proposition 5
We begin by showing that ifM satisfies VM and PI, then it satisfies IC. For a contradiction
assume thatM satisfies VM and PI, but that it does not satisfy IC. Then there exists i ∈ N ,
θi = (vi, bi), θ
′
i = (v
′
i, bi), and θ−i = (v−i, b−i) with vi 6= v
′
i such that
ui(xi(θ
′
i, θ−i), p(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) > ui(xi(θi, θ−i), p(θi, θ−i), θi).
Let cγt(bi, θ−i) ≤ vi ≤ cγt+1(bi, θ−i) and let cγt′ (bi, θ−i) ≤ v
′
i ≤ cγt′+1(bi, θ−i).
If vi > v
′
i then since M satisfies VM and PI the utilities ui and u
′
i that agent i gets
from reports θi and θ
′
i satisfy
ui − u
′
i = (γt − γt′)vi −
t∑
s=t′+1
(γs − γs−1)cγs(bi, θ−i)
≥ (γt − γt′)vi −
t∑
s=t′+1
(γs − γs−1)vi
= 0.
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If vi < v
′
i then since M satisfies VM and PI the utilities u
′
i and ui that agent i gets
from reports θ′i and θi satisfy
u′i − ui = (γt′ − γt)vi −
t′∑
s=t+1
(γs − γs−1)cγs(bi, θ−i)
≤ (γt′ − γt)vi −
t′∑
s=t+1
(γs − γs−1)vi
= 0.
We conclude that in both cases agent i is weakly better off when he reports truthfully.
This contradicts our assumption that M does not satisfy IC.
Next we show that if M satisfies IC, then it satisfies VM. By contradiction assume that
M satisfies IC, but that it does not satisfy VM. Then there exists i ∈ N , θi = (vi, bi),
θ′i = (v
′
i, bi), and θ−i = (v−i, b−i) with vi < v
′
i such that∑
j∈M
xi,j(θi, θ−i)αj >
∑
j∈M
xi,j(θ
′
i, θ−i)αj .
SinceM satisfies IC agent i with type θi does not benefit from reporting θ
′
i, and vice versa.
Thus, ∑
j∈M
xi,j(θi, θ−i)αjvi − pi(θi, θ−i) ≥
∑
j∈M
xi,j(θ
′
i, θ−i)αjvi − pi(θ
′
i, θ−i), and
∑
j∈M
xi,j(θ
′
i, θ−i)αjv
′
i − pi(θ
′
i, θ−i) ≥
∑
j∈M
xi,j(θi, θ−i)αjv
′
i − pi(θi, θ−i).
By combining these inequalities we get
(
∑
j∈M
xi,j(θi, θ−i)αj −
∑
j∈M
xi,j(θ
′
i, θ−i)αj)(vi − v
′
i) ≥ 0.
Since
∑
j∈M xi,j(θi, θ−i)αj >
∑
j∈M xi,j(θ
′
i, θ−i)αj this shows that vi ≥ v
′
i and gives a
contradiction to our assumption that vi < v
′
i.
We conclude the proof by showing that if M satisfies IC, then it satisfies PI. For a
contradiction assume that M satisfies IC, but that it does not satisfy PI. Then there exists
i ∈ N , θ′i = (v
′
i, bi), and θ−i = (v−i, b−i) with cγt′ ≤ v
′
i ≤ cγt′+1 such that
pi(θ
′
i, θ−i) 6= pi((0, bi), θ−i) +
t′∑
s=1
(γs − γs−1)cγs(bi, θ−i),
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where the γs are the sum over the α’s of all possible assignments in non-increasing order
and the cγs(bi, θ−i) are the smallest valuations (or critical valuations) that make agent i
win γs.
Consider the smallest v′i such that this is the case. For this v
′
i we must have v
′
i =
cγt′ (bi, θ−i) > cγ0(bi, θ−i) = 0. We must have v
′
i = cγt′ (bi, θ−i) because by VM agent i’s
assignment for all reports θ′′i = (v
′′
i , bi) with v
′′
i such that cγt′ (bi, θ−i) ≤ v
′′
i ≤ cγt′+1(bi, θ−i)
is the same and, thus, by IC he must face the same payment. We must have cγt′ (bi, θ−i) >
cγ0(bi, θ−i) = 0 because for v
′
i = 0 we have p(θ
′
i, θ−i) = p((0, bi), θ−i) by definition.
Case 1: pi(θ
′
i, θ−i) > pi((0, bi), θ−i) +
∑t′
s=1(γs − γs−1)cγs(bi, θ−i)
Consider θi = (vi, bi) with vi < v
′
i such that cγt′−1(bi, θ−i) ≤ vi ≤ cγt′ (bi, θ−i). Since
vi < v
′
i we have pi(θi, θ−i) = pi((0, bi), θ−i) +
∑t′−1
s=1 (γs − γs−1)cγs(bi, θ−i). If agent i’s type
is θ′i then for the utilities u
′
i and ui that he gets for reports θ
′
i and θi we have
u′i − ui < (γt′ − γt′−1)v
′
i − (γt′ − γt′−1)cγt′ (bi, θ−i) = 0.
This shows that agent i with type θ′i has an incentive to misreport his type as θi and
contradicts our assumption that M satisfies IC.
Case 2: pi(θ
′
i, θ−i) < pi((0, bi), θ−i) +
∑t′
s=1(γs − γs−1)cγs(bi, θ−i)
Let ǫ = pi((0, bi), θ−i)+
∑t′
s=1(γs−γs−1)cγs(bi, θ−i)−pi(θ
′
i, θ−i) and consider θi = (vi, bi)
with vi < v
′
i such that cγt′−1(bi, θ−i) ≤ vi ≤ cγt′ (bi, θ−i). Since vi < v
′
i we have pi(θi, θ−i) =
pi((0, bi), θ−i) +
∑t′−1
s=1 (γs − γs−1)cγs(bi, θ−i). If agent i’s type is θi then for the utilities u
′
i
and ui that he gets from reports θ
′
i and θi we have
u′i − ui = (γt′ − γt′−1)vi − (γt′ − γt′−1)cγt′ (bi, θ−i) + ǫ
Since this is true for all vi with cγt′−1(bi, θ−i) ≤ vi ≤ cγt′ (bi, θ−i) we can choose vi such
that (γt′ − γt′−1)(vi − cγt′ (bi, θ−i)) > −ǫ. We get u
′
i− ui > 0. This shows that agent i with
type θi has an incentive to misreport his type as θ
′
i and contradicts our assumption that
M satisfies IC.
H Proof of Proposition 6
First suppose that the payments are deterministic. If pi > bi then p˜i > bi and
ui(xi, pi, (vi, bi)) = ui(x˜i, p˜i, (v˜i, bi))) = −∞. Otherwise,
ui(xi, pi, (vi, bi)) =
m∑
j=1
(xi,jαjvi)− pi = x˜iv˜i − p˜i = ui(x˜i, p˜i, (v˜i, bi))).
Next suppose that the payments are randomized. If Pr[pi > bi] > 0 then Pr[p˜i > bi] > 0
and E [ui(xi, pi, (vi, bi))] = E [ui(x˜i, p˜i, (v˜i, bi)))] = −∞. Otherwise,
E [ui(xi, pi, (vi, bi))] = E [
m∑
j=1
(xi,jαjvi)− pi] = E [x˜iv˜i − p˜i] = E [ui(x˜i, p˜i, (v˜i, bi))].
27
